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[So F. No. 20123. In Bank. Aug. 3, 1959.] 
GROVER MAcLEOD, Appellant, V. TRIBUNE PUBLISH-
ING COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Pleading-Demurrer-Amendment After Demurrer Sustained. 
-On appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after a 
special and general demurrer to the complaint was sustained 
without leave to amend, the issues presented are whether the 
complaint states a cause of action'and, if not, whether there i~ 
a reasonable possibility that it could be amended to do so. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 103; [2, 3] Libel, § 41; 
[4,7,14,16,23,24] Libel, §'14; [5] Libel, §39; [6] Libel, §52; 
[8] Libel, § 10; [9] Libel, § 82; [10, 13] Libel, § 9; [11, 12] Libel, 
§ 23; [15, 18] Libel, § 51; [17, 22] Libel, § 31; [19, 20] Libel, § 3; 
[21] Libel, §§ 11, 23; [25, 26] Libel; § 30(5); [27] Libel, § 27; 
[28] Pleading, § 90. 
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L2] Libel-Plea.ding-Admissions-Efrect on Appea.l.-In an action 
for libel for publication of a report that the "mouthpiece of 
the communist party" recommended plaintiff for public office, 
assuming that plaintiff's alleged oral admission in the trial 
court that such "mouthpiece" printed a list of recommendations 
that included his name might be considered on appeal from a 
judgment of dismissal, entered after sustaining a demurrer to 
the complaint without leave to amend, such admission was not 
a concession that the allegations of the complaint were untrue. 
[3] Id. - Plea.ding - Admissions - Efrect of Allega.tions of Oom-
plaint a.nd Demurrer.-In an action for-libel for publication 
of a report that the "mouthpiece of the communist party" 
recommended plaintiff for public office, plaintiff's alleged ad-
missions in the trial court that such "mouthpiece" printed a 
list of recommendations that included his name, standing alone, 
would convey the idea that the communist-line paper recom-
mended those listed, but where plaintiff expressly alleged that 
"in truth and in fact the [mouthpiece] did not endorse or 
recommend plaintiff in said article" and that "all said charges, 
references, assertions, and imputations [of defendant's article] 
were false," plaintiff's admission could not be interpreted as 
meaning that the "mouthpiece" itself recommended him, since 
his allegations, admitted by defendant's demurrer, precluded 
giving his admission that interpretation. 
[4] Id.-Utterances Ooncerning Officers or Oa.ndidates.-The only 
reasonable interpretation of defendant's article that the 
"mouthpiece of the communist party" defended a proposal to 
revive ward politics and printed a list of recommendations for 
city council, including plaintiff's name, was that such "mouth-
piece" itself recommended plaintiff for election where defend-
ant's article contained no hint that the printed recommenda-
tions were not those of the communist-line paper itself, and 
where the news value of the article lay, not in the fact that a 
person or persons unnamed recommended plaintiff, but in thlJ 
fact that the communist-line paper did so. 
[5] Id.-Defenses.-In an action for libel for publication of a re-
port that the "mouthpiece of the communist party" recom-
mended plaintiff for public office, the question whether it' was 
libelous falsely to chnrge that a candidate for city" council 
had been recommended by a communist-line paper or the 
"mouthpiece of the communist party" could not be avoided 
on the ground that plaintiff denied that such "mouthpiece" 
was a comlllunist paper, since rpgllrdless of whether or not 
the paper was the "mouthpiece ot" tlw "CllllUiunist party," de-
feudlwt l!O cluuudel"i;r,ed it aud tlllls iufol"lUed it!! readers 
that plaintiff had COllllllunist support, the ~ting of this cha.rge 
being present regardless of the truth of the assertion. 
o 
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[6] IeL-Pleading-Amendments.-In an action for libel for publi-
cation of a report that the "mouthpiece of the cOlUlIlunist 
party" recommended plaintiff for public office, although de-
fendant might be entitled to have the complaint clarified to 
determine whether it must meet the issue of the charader of 
such· "mouthpiece" as well as the issue whether or not it 
recommended plaintiff, an appropriate amendment would serve 
that purpose, and if plaintiff elected to allege specifically that 
the "mouthpiece" was not a communist paper, he would not 
allege himself out of court. 
[7] IeL-Utterances Concerning Officers or Candidates.-It is just 
as defamatory to state that a paper that has recommended 
a candidate is a communist paper when it is not as to state 
that an admittedly communist paper recommended a candidate 
when it did not. 
[8] lei. - Words Actionable Per Se - Imputing Communism.-A 
charge of membership 1'1. the Communist Party or communist 
affiliation or sympathy is libelous on its face. 
[9] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact.-Where plaintiff alleged that 
defendant's article was intended to be and was understood 
as charging that he was a communist sympathizer or fellow 
traveler, whether such article was reasonably susceptible of 
this interpretation was a question for the court and, if so, 
whether it was so understood was a question for the jury. 
[10] IeL-Actionable Words.-The code definition of libel (Civ. 
Code, § 45) includes almost any language which, on its face, 
has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation either 
generally or with respect to his occupation. 
[11] Id.-Construction of Langua.ge Used.-The alleged libelous 
publication should be construed as well from the expressions 
used as from the whole scope and apparent object of the 
writer. 
[12a, 12b] Id.-Construction of Language Used.-An alleged libel-
ous publication should be measured not so much by its effect 
when subjected to the critical analysis of a mind trained in 
the law, but by the natural and probable effect on the mind 
of the average reader. 
[13] Id.-Actionable Words.-A defendant is liable for what is in-
sinuated as well as for what is stated explicitly. 
[14] Id.-Utterances Concerning Officers or Candidates.-Defend-
ant's newspaper article reporting that the "mouthpiece of the 
[8] Imputation of objectionable political or sociological prin-
ciples or practices, note, 33 A.L.R.2d 1196. See alRo Cal.Jur.2d, 
Libel and Slander, § 104: Am.Jur. Liht'l 111111 I::ilunder, §§ 5, ~ t't S~'l. 
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Libel and Slander, §§ 40, 85 et seq.; Am. 
Jnr., Libel and Slander, § 4 et seq. 
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cOUlDlunist party" had recommended plaintiff for public office 
might reasonably be interprcted as charging that plaintiff was 
a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler since, though com-
m~ists may support those who do not sympathize with them 
or even those they secretly oppose, ordinarily persons or 
groups support candidates who are in sympathy with their 
objectives, and candidates are judged at least in part by those 
who support them. The jury might reasonably infer from such 
publication that defendant intended to charge that plaintiff 
was unworthy of public office because he was a communist 
sympathizer. 
[16] ld.-Pleading-Special Damages.-In an action for libel for 
publication of a report that the "mouthpiece of the communist 
party" recommended plaintiff for public office, plaintiff's allega-
tions that as a result of the libel he suffered pecuniary loss ill 
his profession as a dentist in that an "unusually large per-
centage of old and established patients have been cancelling 
appointments" and there "has been a sharp decline in the 
number of ncw patients normally to be expected," that he was 
informed and believed that such loss was a continuing one, 
that the amount of such loss would be $5,000 or more, and 
praying for leavp. of court to amend this allegation to insert 
the true amount of such loss when it becomes known to him, 
were sufficient to plead special damages, the losses being de-
scribed with sufficient particularity to enable defendant to 
prepare its defense and being properly alleged on information 
and belief. (Civ. Code, § 48a.) 
[16] ld.-Utterances Concerning Officers or Candidates.-Defend-
ant's newspaper article reporting that the "mouthpiece of the 
communist party" had recommended plaintiff for public office 
was libelous on its face even if it was susceptible of the 
innocent interpretation that communist support does not re-
flect communist sympathy on the part of the person supported. 
[17] lll.-Damages-Special Damages.-At common law any writ-
ten defamation or libel was actionable without proof of special 
damages, but a limitation on this rule is recognized when 
the defamatory meaning of the language is not apparent on 
its face. • 
[18] Ill. - Plea.ding - Special Damages.-Avel'ment and proof of 
special damages is required only when the libelous meaning 
of the words is covert and not apparcnt on the face of the 
language used. 
[19] ld.-Elements of Defamation.-To constitute a libel it is not 
necessary that there be a direct and spPcific allegation of im-
proper conduct, as in a pleading. The charge lllay be either 
expl'essly stated or implied; in the latter case the impliclltior. 
(J 
C) 
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may hI' appan~nt from the language used or of such a character 
as to require stah'mcnt and proof of extrinsic facts (induce-
ment, colloquium and innuendo) to show its meaning. 
[20] Id.-Elements of Defamation.-Under Civ. Code, § 45a, de-
fining libel on its face and stating when defamatory language 
not libelous on its face is actionable, language may be libelous 
on its face though it may also be susceptible of an innocent 
interpretation. The test is whether a defamatory meaning 
appears from the language itself without the necessity of 
explanation or the pleading of extrinsic facts; if it does, 
whether the charge be directly made or merely implied, the 
publication (without averment, colloquium or innuendo) will 
in itself constitute a libel. 
[21 Id.-Intent and Understanding: Construction of Language 
Used.-The fact that an implied defamatory charge or in-
sinuation leaves room for an innocent interpretation as well 
does not establish that the defamatory meaning does not ap-
pear from the language itself. The language used may give 
rise to conflicting inferences as to the meaning intended, but 
when it is addressed to the public at large it is reasonable to 
assume that at least some of the readers will take it in its 
defamatory sense. 
[22] Id.-Dama.ges-Specia.l Damages.-The purpose of the rule 
requiring proof of special damages when the defamatory 
meaning does not appear on the face of the language used 
is to protect publishers who make statements innocent in them- ! 
selves that are defamatory only because of extrinsic facts 
known to the reader. 
[28] Id.-Utterances Concerning Officers or Candidates.-It would 
be a reproach to the law to hold that a defendant intent on 
destroying the reputation of a political opponent by falsely 
labeling him a Communist or communist sympathizer could 
achieve his purpose without liability by casting his defamatory 
18liguage in the form of an insinuation that left room for an 
unintended innocent meaning. 
[24] Id.-Utterances Concerning Officers or Ca.ndidates.-When it 
can reasonably be inferred from the language used in a news· 
paper article that defendant intended to, charge pluintiff with 
communist sympathies nnd that many renders so interpretl!ti 
its article, and defendant aumitted by demurring t1\Ut such WIl>I 
its intent and the menning plnctld on its article, defendant 
mny not be heard to contend thut it should 'escape liabilit.y 
on the ground that owing to a possible innocent menning 
some of its readers did not dl·aw the defumatory inference it 
intended that they should. (Disnpproving possible-innocent-
meaning rule of Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal.App.2d 581 [126 
P.2d 6881, followed or repented in Washer v. R,lfIk of AmericlI, 
C] 
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21 Cal.2d 822,828 [136 P.2d 297]; Babcock v. lIfcClatchy News-
·papers, 82 Cal.App.2d 528, 538 [186 P.2d 737]; Smith v. LOll 
An!lell'lI Bookbindl'rs Union, 133 Cal.App.2d 486, 493 [284 P.2d 
·194]; Menefee v. Codman, 155 Cal.App.2d 396, 405 [317 P.2d 
.1032];· Jef/ers v. Screen Extras Guild, 162 Cal.App.2d 717, 
730 [328 P.2d 1030].) 
[25] ld.-Privileged Communications-Newspaper Publications.-
In an action for libel for publication of a report that the 
"mouthpiece of the communist party" recommended plaintiff 
for public office, plaintiff's allegations that defendant published i 
the article "falsely and maliciously and with intent to injure, 
disgrace and defame plaintiff," and that "all said charges, 
references, assertions, and imputations were false, malicious, 
and unprivileged, and were calculated to and did expose plain-
tiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy," were suffi-
cient, when coupled with allegations that defendant published 
its article with knowledge of its falsity or without an honest 
belief in its truth, to defeat defendant's eIaim that the article 
was privileged. The privilege is also lost if defendant had 
no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true. 
[26] ld.-Privileged Communications-Newspaper Publications.-
In an action for libel for publication of a report that the 
"mouthpiece of the communist party" recommended plaintiff 
for public office, though plaintiff did not specifically allege 
that defendant knew that its article was false, had no honest 
belief in its truth, or had no reasonable grounds for believing 
it to be true, one or more of these grounds for defeating the 
qualified privilege of a newspaper publication were implicit 
in the allegation that defendant's article was false. Any defect 
in failing expressly to plead one or more of these bases for 
defeating the qualified privilege could easily be curcd by 
amendment. 
[27] Id.-Mitigation-Retraction.-In an action for libel for pub-
lication of a report that the "mouthpiece of the communist 
party" recommended plaintiff for public office, plaintiff ade-
quately specified the statements claimed to be libelous so as 
to pennit defendant intelligently to comply with plaintiff's 
demand for rctraction, as provided in Civ. Code, § 48'a, where 
the article was short, it was set out in plaintiff's demand, and 
plaintiff, by stating that the article was "grossly libelous" and 
demanding a correction or retraction pursuant to § 48a, made 
clear that he was objecting to the statement that referred to 
him, which statement was libelous on its face. 
[28] Pleading - Demurrer - Ambiguity and Uncertainty. - The 
court in its discretion muy require the clarification of IlIIY 
ullcertainties or ambiguities in the complaint. 
C) 
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. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of A la-
meda County. Charles Wade Snook, Judge. Reversed. 
·Action for damages for libel. Judgment for dcfendant 
after sustaining a general and special demurrer without leave 
to amend, reversed. 
Graves, Hove & MacLeod and Donald MacLeod for Ap-
pellant. 
Price, Macdonald & Knox, Harry L. Price and John Charles 
Houlihan for Respondent. 
Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge, J. Hart Clinton, 
Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Herbert E. Hall, John 
D. Gallaher, Cooper, White & Cooper, John J. Hamlyn, Flint 
& MacKay and McInerney & Jacobs as Amici Curiae on be-
half of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-[l] This appeal is from a judgment of 
dismissal entered after defendant's special and general de-
murrer to plaintiff's original complaint for libel was sustained 
without leave to amend. Accordingly, the issues presented are 
whether the complaint states a cause of action, and if not, 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that it could be 
amended to do so. (See Lemoge Electric v. County' of San 
Mateo, 46 Ca1.2d 659, 664[297 P.2d 638] ; 2 Witkin,Cali-
fornia Procedure, Pleading, § 505, pp. 1496-1497.) 
Plainti1f's complaint alleged that he is a doctor of dental 
surgery practicing in Oakland and that he enjoyed a good 
name and reputation in his profession and occupation. On 
April 19, 1955, defendant printed, published, and circulated 
in its newspaper, the Oakland Tribune, "on the front page 
thereof, an article or statement in writing in which said" 
defendant" falsely and maliciously and with intent to injure, ! 
disgrace and defame plainti1f, used and pUblished the follow-
ing language of and concerning the plaintiff: 
" 'RED PAPER ISSUES ELECTION EXTRA 
" 'The San Francisco People's World, recognized through-
out the state as the mouthpiece of the communist party, dis-
tributed a last-minute extra edition ill Oakland yesterday, 
0/1 the eVe or the I'ity electioll. 
" 'It verified reports that the paper is showing unusual 
illterest in Oakland and its ~ity election. 
() 
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" 'The Communist-line paper defended the proposal to re-
vive ward politics in Oakland and printed a list of recom-
mendations which included the names of council candidates 
John F. Quinn, John W. Holmdahl, and Dr. Grover H. Mac-
Leod. It a1<;0 listed recommendations against police reorgan-
ization measures which were endorsed by the Alameda County 
Grand Jury following its recent investigation. 
" 'The polls are open until 7 p.m. today.' " 
Defendant "by said publication intended to be understood 
by the general public and readers, and it was so understood 
by them, as charging, asserting, and imputing that this plain-
tiff was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler, and that 
this plaintiff had received a recommendation from 'The San 
Francisco People's World,' and that the said San Francisco 
People's World had 'distributed a last-minute extra edition in 
Oakland' which allegedly contained the recommendation as 
aforesaid, (when in truth and in fact the San Francisco 
People's World did not endorse or recommend plaintiff in said 
article), and all said charges, references, assertions, and im-
putations were false, malicious, and unprivileged, and were 
calculated to and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, 
ridicule, and obloquy, causing him to be shunned and avoided, 
and proximately caused him to sustain a severe and continuing 
nervous shock and strain and to suffer great merital anguish, ' 
mortification, humiliation, and shame; all to his damage in the ' 
sum of $200,000.00." Plaintiff also suffered pecuniary loss in 
his profession as a dentist. 
Plaintiff served a demand for a correction upon defendant 
pursuant to section 48a of the Civil Code, but no correction 
was made. He prayed for special, general, and exemplary 
damages and the costs of suit. 
"Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, 
printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the 
6Ye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or 
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or 
which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." (Civ. 
Code, § 45.) . 
Defendant contends that plaintiff has not adequately alleged; 
that its statement was false and that he conceded ill oral 
argument before the trial court that he could not do so. It 
points out that the complaint refers to an article iIi the 
People's World, that it may be inferred that plaintiff was 
named therein, and that plaintiff admitted in the trial court 
!. A 
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that the People's World printed a list of recommendations 
that included his name. [2] The transcript of the oral pro-
ceedings before the trial court is not before us, however, and 
plaintiff's alleged admission appears only in what purports 
to be a brief excerpt of that transcript quoted in defendant's 
brief in the trial court.1 Even if we assume that under these 
" circumstances plaintiff's alleged admission may be considered 
on appeal, that admission is not a concession that the allega-
tions of the complaint are untrue. The sting of the alleged 
libel is that the People's World, a communist-line paper, en-
dorsed and recommended plaintiff for election and that there-
fore he was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler. 
[3] We agree with defendant, that standing alone the ad-
mission that the paper printed a list of recommendations 
would convey the idea that the paper recommended those listed. 
Plaintiff expressly alleged in his complaint, however, that "in 
truth and in fact the San Francisco People's W orId did not 
endorse or recommend plaintiff in said article" and that "aU 
said charges, references, assertions, and imputations [of de-
fcndant's article] were false." In the light of these allega-
tions, plaintiff's admission cannot be interpreted as meaning 
that the People's World itself recommended him, for his 
allegations, admitted by defendant's demurrer, preclude giv-
ing his admission that interpretation. 
[4] The only reasonable interpretation of defendant's 
article, however, is that the People's World itself recom-" 
mended plaintiff for election. The article dealt specifically 
with the interest being shown by the People 's World in the 
Oakland election, it expressly pointed out that that paper de-
fended the proposal to revive ward politics, and it contained 
no hint that the printed recommendations were not those of 
·the paper itself. Defendant was reporting news, and the 
news value of its article lay, not in the fact that a person 
or persons unnamed recommended plaintiff, but in the fact 
that the People's World did so. Certainly no reader would 
reasonably assume that defendant meant no more than that 
the People's World had printed the recommendations of un-
named third persons or carried a political advertisement in its 
columns. Accordingly, "the question presented is whether it 
1" 'THE CoURT: In other words, do I understand that :rou den:r that 
the paper printed a list of recommendations which included the name 
of the Plainti1ff 
" 'Ma. MACLEOD [Plaintiff's counsel]: We do not dell:r that, :rour 
Hont)r.' " 
.. ~ 
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is libelous falsely to charge that a candidate for city council 
has been recommended by a communist-line paper or the 
mouthpiece of the Communist Party. 
[5] This question cannot be avoided, as defendant con-
tends, on the ground that plaintiff has denied that the People's 
World is a communist paper. Defendant states that plaintiff 
has pleaded that all of the charges in defendant's article are 
false. It contends that he has therefore taken the position that 
the People's World is not a communist paper and points out 
that it is not libelous to state that a person has been recom-
mended by a noncommunist paper. This contention is patently 
absurd. Whether or not the People's World is "the mouth-
piece of the communist party" and a "Communist-line pa-
per," defendant so characterized it and thus informed its 
readers that plaintiff had communist support. The sting of 
this charge is present whether or not the People's World is 
in fact a communist paper, and accordingly, even if plaintiff 
has taken the position in his complaint that it is not a commu-
nist paper, he has not pleaded that defendant's article was 
nondefamatory. Moreover, plaintiff's allegations of falsity 
may reasonably be interpreted as denying only the charges 
as they pertained to him by imputing to him communist sup-
port and therefore communist sympathies. [6] Although de-
fendant may be entitled to have the complaint clarified to 
determine whether it must meet the issue of the character of 
the People's World as well as the issue whether or not it 
recommended plaintiff, it is obvious that an appropriate 
amendment would serve that purpose, and that even if plain-
tiff elects to allege specifically that the People's World is not 
a communist paper, he will not allege himself out of court. 
[7] It is just as defamatory to state that a paper that has 
recommended a candidate is a communist paper when it is not 
as to state that an admittedly communist paper recommended 
a candidate when it did not.2 
'We, of course, intend to express DO opinion as to whether or not the 
People's World is the mouthpiece of the Communist Party and a com-
munist-line paper. Defendant in its article stated that it is, but as it 
interprets plaintiff's complaint, it has admitted by demurring that it is 
not for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the complaint. Unless it 
may be judicially noticed that the People's World is a communist paper, 
if a cause of aetion is otherwise stated, plaintiff is entitled to put the 
character of the People's World in issue. He mny plead falsity either in 
the characterization of the paper, the statement of wllom it recoDUuended 
or both. If it were judicially noticed, however, that the People's World 
is a communist paper, any allegation in the complaint to the contrar'y ! 
52 C.2d-IB 
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[8] 'Whatever thc rule 1llay hayc been when anticolllmunist 
sentiment was less crystalliu'd Ihan it i~ t.oday (see Harris v. 
CUI·tis Publishing Co., 49 Ca1.App.2d 340, 348 [121 P.2d 
7.61] ; .Gallagher v. Chet'alas, 48 Cal.App.2d 52, 59 [119 P.2d 
408] ), it is now settled that a charge of membership in the 
Communist Party or commuuist affiliation or sympathy is 
libelous on its face. (Farr v. Bramblett, 132 Cal.App.2d 36, 
48 [281 P.2d 372] ; Utah State Fa)·m Bnrea1t Federation v. 
National Farmers U.S. Corp., 198 F.2d 20, 23; Grant v. 
Reader's D/:gest Ass'?l, 151 F.2d 733, 734; see also Black v. 
Clttter Laboratories, 43 Ca1.2d 788, 800 [278 P.2d 905] ; Pros-
ser, Torts [2d ed.] 578; Yankwieh, Certainty in the Law of 
Defamation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 163, 168; note, 33 A.L.R.2d 
1196, 1212.) [9] Plaintiff alleged that defendant's article 
was intended to be and was understood as charging that he 
was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler. Whcther or 
not the article is reasonably susceptible of this interpretation 
is a question for the court and, if so, whether or not it wes so 
understood is a question for the jury. (Maller v. Devlin, 203 
Cal. 270, 278 [263 P. 812] ; Mellen v. Times-Mirror Co., 167 
Cal. 587, 593 [140 P. 277, Ann.Cas. 1915C 766] ; Keenan v. 
Dean, 134 Cal.App.2d 189, 195 [285 P.2d 300] ; Ga.llaglte1· v. 
Chevalas,48 Cal.App.2d 52,58 [119 P.2d 408].) 
[10] "The code definition of libel is very broad and has 
been held to include almost any language which, upon its 
face, has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation, 
either generally, or with respect to his occupation. (Schom-
berg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224 [64 P. 290] ; Stevens v. Snow, 191 
. Cal. 58, 62 [214 P. 968] ; Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266, 272 
[46 P. 103].) [11] In the determination of this question, the 
alleged libelous pUblication is to be construed 'as well from 
the expressions used, as from the whole scope aud apparent 
object of the writer.' (Stevens v. Storke, 191 Cal. 329, 334 
[216 P. 371, 373] ; Bettnet· v. Holt, 70 Cal. 270 [11 P. 713, 
715].) The case last above cited states that 'not only is the 
language employed to be regarded with reference to the aetnal 
words used, but according to the sense a11<l meaning under all 
the cireumstances attending the puhlil·at.ioll whil·h such lan-
~uage may fairly be presumed to have cOI1V<'yed to those to 
would have to be disregarded (see 2 Wit.kin. California Procedure 
Pleading, ~ 208, pp. 1185-1186), and the whole ba~is of defendant 's un~ 
tenable contention that plaintiff has pleaded that the artil'le was innocent 
because he pleaded that the People's World is not a cOIIJUIunist pappr 
would collapse. 
,. 
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whom it wa" published. So that in such cases the language is 
uniformly to be reg-arded with what has been its effect, aetual 
or presumed, and its sense is to be arrived at with the help 
of the cause and the occasion of its publication. And in pass-
ing upon the sufficiency of such language as stating a cause 
of actioli, n. court is to place itself in the situation of the hearer 
or reader, and determine the sense or meaning of the language 
of the complaint for libelous publication according to its 
natural and popular construction.' [12a] That is to say, the 
publication is to be measured not so much by its effect when 
subjected to the critical analysis of a mind trained in the law, 
but by the natural and probable effect upon the mind of the 
average reader. [13] A defendant is liable for what is in-
sinuated, as well as for what is stated explicitly. (ScllOmbel·g 
v. Walker, supra, p. 227.)" (Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438, 
441-442 [2 P.2d 383].) 
[14] )Ieasured by the foregoing tests, defendant's article 
may rcasonahly be interpreted as charging that plaintiff was 
a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler. It is true that 
Communists may support those who do not sympathize with 
them. They may even support openly those they secretly op-
pose for the very purpose of tainting their opponents with 
their own unpopUlarity and thus aiding in their defeat. Ordi-
narily, however, persons, groups, or parties support candidates 
who are in sympathy with their objectives, and candidates are 
judged at least in part by those who support them. Indeed 
the relevance of plaintiff's supporters to his fituess for public 
office is basic to defendant's conteution, discussed later, that 
its article was privileged. Its article was published on the day 
of the election and pointed out that the polls were yet to close. 
It contained no hint or suggestion that the communist rec-
ommendations were not to be taken or should not be taken to 
mean that communist support reflected communist sympathies 
of those supported. Certainly few if any of defendant's read-
ers would conclude that defendant printed the article to assist 
plaintiff's clection, nor would they be likely to view it as a 
purely neutral gesture. Under the circumstances they might 
reasonably infer that defendant intended to charge that plain-
tiff was unworth)~ of public office because he was a communist 
sympathizc.·. A reasonalJIe jury ('ould find that defendant 
e1ea.·ly ~() illsi lIualed. 
Dcfeuuallt eOlltellus, howevel·, that sillec i!,; artide is llls() 
susceptible of an inllocent int.erpl·etatiou, it is not libelous 011 
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its face, that therefore an allegation of special damages is 
pssential, and that plaintiff's allegations of special damages 
are insufficient. (See Civ. Code, § 45a.) 
[15] Section 48a of the Civil Code provides that special 
damages '.' are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves 
that he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, 
profession or occupation, including such amount .. of money as 
the plaintiff alleges and proves he has expended as a result of 
the alleged libel, and no other; ... " Plaintiff alleged that as 
a result of the libel he "has suffered pecuniary loss in his pro-
fession as a dentist" in that an "unusually large percentage 
of old and established patients have been cancelling appoint-
ments," and there "has been a sharp decline in the number of 
new patients normally to be expected. Plaintiff does not at 
this time know the exact extent of pecuniary loss resulting 
from the foregoing, but is informed and believes, and there-
fore alleges, that said loss is a continuing one, and that the 
amount of said loss will be in the sum of $5,000.00 or more; 
and plaintiff prays leave of Court to amend this allegation to 
insert the true amount of said loss when the same becomes 
known to him." These allegations are sufficient. The losses 
stated are included in the statutory definition, they are de-
scribed with sufficient particularity to enable defendant to 
prepare its defense, and under the circumstances stated the 
extent of the loss may be alleged on information and belief. 
(PJ·idonof! v. Balokovich, 36 Ca1.2d 788, 792-793 [228 P. 
2d 6].) . 
[16] In any event, defendant's article is libelous on its 
face even if it is susceptible of the innocent interpretation 
that communist support does not reflect communist sympathy 
on the part of the person supported. [17] At common law 
any written defamation or libel was actionable without proof 
of special damages (see R-est., Torts, § 569; Prosser, Torts [2d 
cd.] 587). In Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266 [46 P. 103], 
however, this court recognized a limitation on the common-
law rule when the defamatory meaning of the language used 
is not apparent on its face. [18] "It is only when the 
libelous meaning of the publication is covert-not apparent on 
the face of the language used-that averment and proof of 
special damage is required." (114 Cal. at p. 271.) [19] The 
limitation was further elu(:idated ill Sc1!omberg v. Walker, 
132 Cal. 224, 227-228 [64 P. 290]. "'1'0 constitute a libel it is 
)lot necessary that there be a direct and specific allegation of 
improper conduct, as in a pleading. The charge may be either 
() 
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expressly stated or implied; and in the latter case the implica- i 
tion' may be either apparent from the language used, or of 
such a character as to require the statement and proof of ex-
trinsic facts (inducement, colloquiz,m, and innuendo) to show 
its meaning. In the last case, proper allegations and proofs of 
the facts necessary to make the meaning of the language ap-
parent will be required. Otherwise, whether the charge be 
directly made or merely implied, the publication-without 
averment, colloquium, or innuendo-will, in itself, constitute 
a libel. 'The construction which it behooves a court of justice 
to put on a publication which is alleged to be libelous is to bl! 
derived as well as from the expressions used as from the whole 
scope and apparent object of the writer.' (Oooper v. Greeley, 
1 Denio, 358.) Thus in the case cited, the charge was not 
'made in an open and direct manner'; 'but,' it was said by 
the court, 'an imputation made in that form is not the less 
actionable.' " 
In 1945 the Legislature codified the rule of the Tonini and 
Schomberg cases by enacting section 45a of the Civil Code, 
which provides: 
"A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the 
necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, in-
nuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. 
Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable 
unlei!s the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered spe-
cial damage as a proximate result thereof. Special damages 
is defined in section 48a of this code." 
[20] When section 45a is read in the light of the Schom-
berg case it is clear that language may be libelous on its face 
even though it may also be susceptible of an innocent interpre-
tation. The tcst is whether a defamatory meaning appears 
from the language itself without the necessity of explanation 
or the pleading of extrinsic facts. If it does, "whether the 
charge be directly made or merely implied, the publication-
without ave"ment, colloquium, or innuendo-will, .in itself, 
constitute a libeL" 
[21] The fact that an implied defamatory charge or in-
sinuation leaves room for an innocent interpretation as well 
does not establish that the defamatory meaning does not ap-
pear from the language itself. The language ui!ed may give 
rise to conflicting inferences as to the meaning intended, but 
when it is addressed to the public at large, it is reasonable to 
assume that at least some of the readers will take it in its de-
famatory sense. (Sc.'e Spiegel, Defamation by Implication, 29 
/~) 
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So.Cal.L.TIIl\' a06, 312.) In Peabudy v. BarluulI, 52 Cal.App. 
2d 581 [126 P.2d 668j, howevcr, thc court overlooked this 
fact. In that case the defcndant printed the statement that 
"Eddie Peabody's divorcing wife, ten years his senior, is also 
·his aunt!" The plaintiff was Eddie Peabody's "divorcing 
,"ife," aud she contended that the language charged her with I 
incest. Although more charitably minded readers might as- i 
sume that the plaintiff was the widow of Eddie's deceased 
uncle and not a blood relative, certainly a jury could reason-
ably infer from the publication of the language it<;elf that 
many readers would understand it in a defamatory sense. 
Nevertheless, the court held that because of the possible hlllO-
cent meaning of the lauguage used, it was not defamatory on 
its face and that therefore proof of special damages was 
essential. The Schomberg case was not cited. 
[22] The purpose of the rule requh·ing proof of special 
damages when the defamatory meaning does not appear on the 
face of the language used is to protect publishers who make 
statements innocent in tllemselves that are defamatory only 
because of extrinsic facts known to the reader. For example, 
a newspaper might erroneously report that "Mrs. A gave birth 
to a child last night." Mrs. A has been married only a month. 
The language used will take on a defamatory meaning only 
to. those who know when Mrs. A was married, and many of 
them will also know that the paper made a mistake. In such a 
case, general damages for loss of reputation may be trivial, 
and the paper's mistake may havc been innocent, for the 
content of its report would not alert it to the possibility of 
defamation. It is not unreasonable therefore to require proof 
of special damages. to establish a cause of action. The case 
would he entirely different, however, if the paper reported 
that "Mrs. A, who was married last month, gave birth to a 
child last night." A charge of immoral conduct is apparent to 
all from the language used, and the paper knows and is fully 
warned of the defamatory implication. Under the rule of the 
Peabody case, however, it would escape liability unlcss special 
damages are proved, for the language U!'H'd doeR not exclude 
the innocent possibility tlIat MI·s. A was widowed or divorced 
a few months he fore her recent nUlI-riage and that the ehild 
is that of her forlllP.r husband. 
[12b] Such hair-splitting. analysis of lallguage has no 
place ill the law of defamation, dealing as it does with the 
impact of communications between ordinary human bpings. 
o 
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. I t is inconsistent with the rnle that" the publication is to be 
mcasured not so much by its effect when subjected to the 
. critical analysis of a mind trained in the law, but by the 
·natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average 
reader." (Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438, 442 [2 P.2d 383).) 
It protects, not the innocent defamer whose words are libelous 
only because of facts unkno,vn to him, but the clever writer 
vcrscd in the law of defamation who deliberately casts a 
grossly defamatory imputation in ambiguous language. It not 
only finds no support in, but is contrary to, the provisions of 
section 45a, which define, not language susceptible of only one 
meaning, but language that carries a defamatory meaning on 
its face. [23] It would be a reproach to the law to hold that 
a defendant intent on destroying the reputation of a political 
opponent by falsely labeling him a Communist or communist 
sympathizer could achieve his purpose without liability by 
casting his defamatory language in the form of an insinuation ' 
that left room for an unintended innocent meaning. 
[24] When as in this case, it can be reasonably inferred from 
the language used that defendant intended to charge plaintiff 
with communist sympathies and that many readers so inter-
preted its article, and defendant has admitted by demurring 
that such was its intent and the meaning placed on its article, 
it ill befits defendant to contend that it should escape liability 
on the ground that owing to a possible innocent meaning some 
of its readers did not draw the defamatory inference it in-
tended that they should. 
The possible-innocent-meaning rule of the Peabody case was 
repeated in a dictum in Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Ca1.2d ; 
822, 828 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338), and it has been 
fonowed or rep<.'ated in subsequent District Courts of Appeal 
decisions. (See Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal. 
App.2d 528, 538 [186 P.2d 737J ; Smith v. Los Angeles Book-
binders Union, 133 Cal.App.2d 486, 493 [284 P.2d 194J; 
Mcnefee v. Codman, 155 Cal.App.2d 396, 465 [317 P.2d 
1032J; Jeffers v. Sct'cen Extras Guild, 162 Cal.App.2d 717, 
730 [328 P.2d 1030J.) To the extcnt these cases are incon-
sistent with our conclusion herein they are disapproved. 
Since it appears from the complaint that plaintiff was a 
candidate for public office and thnt d"fendant's article re-
ported fa.·t:;; relevant to his <jlmlificatiolls. defendant contends 
that the al"! ide was pl'jvilegcll (see Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 3; 
Snively v. Record Pu.blishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 571 [198 P. 
o 
552 MAcLEOD v. TRmUNE PUBLISHING CO. [52 C.2d 
1]) and that plaintiff's allegations of malice are insufficient 
t.o defeat the privilege. (See Locke v. Mitchell, 7 Cal.2d 599, 
602 l61 P.2d 922]; Harnish v. Smith, 138 Cal.App.2d 307, 
310 [291 P.2d 532] ; Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal.App.2d 649, 660-
661 [171 P.2d 118] ; Irwin v. Newby, 102 Cal.App. 110, 113 
[282 P. 810, 283 P. 370J.) [25] Plaintiff alleged that de-
fendant published the article "falsely and maliciously and 
with intent to injure, disgrace, and defame plaintiff," and 
that "all said charges, references, assertions, and imputations 
were false, malicious, and unprivileged, and were calculated to 
and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and 
obloquy." Similar allegations of malice have been held suffi-
cient when coupled with allegations that defendant published 
its article with knowledge of its falsity or without an honest 
belief in its truth. (Washe1· v. Bank of America, 21 Ca1.2d 
822, 831 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338J; Morcom v. San 
Francisco Shopping News, 4 Cal.App.2d 284, 289 [40 P.2d 
940] ; see also Tingley v. Times Mirror, 151 Cal. 1, 14 [89 P. 
1097J.) The privilege is also lost if defendant had no 
reasonable grounds for believing his statement to be true. 
(Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 797 [197 
P.2d 713J ; Emde v. San Joaquin etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 
154 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916J ; Mtles v. Rosenthal, 90 Cal. 
App. 390, 407 [266 P. 320] ; see Restatement, Torts, § 601; 
Prosser, Torts [2d ed.] 628.) [26] Although plaintiff has 
not specifically alleged that defendant knew that its article 
was false, had no honest belief in its truth, or had no reason-
able grounds for believing it to be true, under the circum-
stances of this case one or more of these grounds for defeating 
the qualified privilege are implicit in the allegation that 
defendant's article was false. Thus, with a copy of the Peo-
ple's World election extra before it or readily available, de-
fendant should have had no difficulty in accurately reporting 
the extra's recommendations. Defendant's failure to do so 
indicates at least a lack of reasonable grounds for its report. 
Such failure is also consistent with a lack of honest belief or 
intentional falsehood on defendant's part.I • Any defect in 
failing expressly to plead one 'or more of these bases for 
·We assume in making these eommenta that the People'. World printed 
an election extra, and that plaintiff ,only intended to plead that the 
paper did not endorse him. Of eourse, if we interpret hill eomplaint as 
denying the truth of all of the facts lltated in defendant's article, &lI 
alleging, in effect, that the article was entirely falJrieated, an inferential 
allegation of bad faith or intentional falsehood would be inescapable. 
o 
o 
AUJ. 19Wj MACL~:oll 1:. TIU&UNE PUm,(:'lHNO Co. 5:ia 
152 (" .2d 536: 343 P.2d 361 
-- .... __ .. ---- ..... --------
defeating the qllaliflp.(J privilp.ge ronld pasily be cured by 
amendment. 
Section 48a of the Ch·il Code provides in part: 
'-'In any action for damages for the publication of a libel 
in a newSpaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff 
shall recover no more than special damages unless a correc-
tion be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as here-
inafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, 
at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of 
broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed 
to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected .... " 
Defendant contends that plaintiff's demand for a correction 
was insufficient and that therefore he has not stated a cause 
of action for general or exemplary damages. Plaintiff wrote 
defendant's publisher as follows: 
"I wish to call your attention to a purported news report 
which appeared in the Oaldand TrIbune on Tuesday, April 
19, 1955, in all editions on Page 1 of your publication. The 
article reads as follows: 
" [Entire article set out in 17 typewritten lines.] 
"This article is grossly libelous and I therefore demand 
that the same be corrected or retracted as provided in Section 
48 (a) of the Civil Code of the State of California." 
[27] Defendant contends that plaintiff did not adequately 
specify" the statements claimed to be libelous" so as to permit 
it intelligently to comply with his demand. It relies on 
Anderson v. Hearst Publishing 00., 120 F.Supp. 850. In that 
case, however, defendant published a lengthy article of three 
columns by ten inches in which there were eight references 
to the plaintiff. His demand for correction stated that "Your 
issue of November 24th, 1952, carried, under the by-line of 
Westbrook Pegler, certain statements regarding me which are 
untrue, libelous and damaging ...• " The demand for re-
traction was held insufficient on the ground that plaintiff had 
failed to specify which of the "certain statements" he deemed 
libelous. In the present case, on the contrary, the article was 
short, it was set out in plaintiff's demand, and it made only 
one reference to him. By stating that the article was "grossly 
libelous" and demanding a correction or retraction pursuant 
to section 48a, plaintiff made clear that he was objecting to the 
statement that referred to him, namely, that a communist-
line paper had printed a list of recommendations including 
his name. Morf'over, that statement was libelous on its fal'e. 
554 MAcLEOD v. 'fRmuNE PUBLISlJING CO. [52 C.2d 
--------------------------_._--
Wr-. cannot believe t.hat. defendant was so unaware of the 
-Hij:?,"Jlifirance of what it Ill'inted t.hat it did not realize what 
_language plaiutiff objected to and wished corrected. Plaintiff 
gave .defendant fair notice and adequately specified "the 
statements claimed to be libelous." (Civ. Code, § 48a; 
Uhlman v. Farm Stock &- Home 00., 126 Minu. 239, 242 [148 
N.W. 102, Ann.Cas. 1915D 888].) 
For the reasons stated the trial court erred in sustaining 
the demurrer without leave to amend. As indicated in our 
discussion, however, there are certain allegations that could 
be clarified or more explicitly stated. Moreover, the complaint 
may be subject to other grounds stated ill the special de-
murrer but not urged on appeal. [28] The trial court may in 
its discretion require clarification of any uncertainties or 
ambiguities. (Wennerholm v. StalL[ord Univ. Sch. of Med., 
20 Cal.2d 713, 720 [128 P.2d 522, 141 A.TJ.R. 1358].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schaner, J., and Dooling, J. pro tern.,· con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I disseut. It is my view that Canon 19 of 
Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association relative to 
dissenting opinions is in the public interest and should be 
carefully adhered to by reviewing courts. Insofar as material 
here, it reads: "Except in case of conscientious d;ifference o[ 
opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should 
be discouraged in courts of last rcsort. " (Vol. 62, Reports of 
American Bar Association (1937), p. 1129, canon 19.) (Italics 
added.) 1 
In the present case I conscientiously differ from the con-
. elusions and reasoning of the majority opinion. It is my view 
that one of the most important duties of the judiciary is to 
maintain the freedom of the press. Article I, section 9, of the 
Constitution of the State of California reads, in part: "Every 
(·itizen may freely speak, write, and publish 'his sentiments-
on all suhjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; 
und no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the libert.y 
of speech or of the press." The First Amendment to the COIl-
stitution of the United States reads, in part: "Congress shall 
.. Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Coullcil. 
1My views relative to dissenting opinions will be found in Priebe v. 
Sinclair, 90 Cal.App.2d 79, at p. 87 1202 P.2il !i771. 
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make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof j or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press." 
I state that it is one of the most important duties of the 
judiciary to maintain the freedom of the press, for the reason 
that it is my belief that a free and independent government 
can only be preserved by maintaining a 'l"ell-informed elec-
torate. History has demonstrated that the best method of 
keeping the citizenry informed is through the medium of the 
press. It is my considered opinion that the free press' fore-
most obligation is to advise the electorate of all the qualifica-
tions or disqualifications of each candidate for public office, 
which obviously includes his party affiliations, be they com-
munist or otherwise, his associates, the individuals, organiza-
tions and groups by whom he is endorsed and who are seeking 
his election to public office. 
In my opinion, in the present case the defendant has merely, 
within the constitutional guarantee, endeavored to comply 
with the public duty it owed to the citizenry concerning a 
candidate for public office. 
Plaintiff was a candidate for the City Council of Oakland 
at the April 1955 election. Thereafter he filed a complaint 
against defendant, Tribune Publishing Co., I11C., alleging 
that he was a doctor of dental surgery practicing in Oak-
land and that prior to the publication in the Oakland Tribune 
hereinafter set forth, he enjoyed a good name and reputation 
in his profession and occupation. 
It was further alleged: 
"That on the 19th day of April, 1955, in all the editions of 
said newspaper, defendants printed, published, and circulated, 
or caused to be printed, published, and eirc.ulated in said 
newspaper, 011 the front page thereof, an article or state-
ment in writing in which said defendants falsely and malic-
iously and with intent to injure, disgrace, and defame plain-
tiff, used and published the following language of alid con-
cerning the plaintiff: 
'RED PAPER ISSUES ELECTION EXTRA 
'TIle San Fl'anrisco People's WOl·lf1. reeogriized through-
out the slate :ts the mOlltllpi('('c of tIll! ('ommunist party, 
distrilmtecl a last-minute extra euition in Oakland yes-
terday, on the eve of the cit~- eleetion. 
C) 
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'It verified reports that the paper is showing unusual 
" interest in Oaklaud and its city election. 
'The Communist-line paper defended the proposal to 
" rcvive ward politics in Oakland and printed a list of 
"recommendations which included the names of council 
candidates John F. Quinn, John W. Holmdahl, and Dr. 
Grover H. MacLeod. It also listed recommendations 
against police reorganization measures which were en-
dorsed by the Alameda County Grand Jury following its 
recent investigation. 
'The polls are open until 7 p.m. today.' 
"That Said article and publication was read by the readers 
of said newspaper at said time and on said occasion in the 
city of Oakland and in the County of Alameda and throughout 
the State of California; and that said defendants by said 
publication intended to be understood by the general public 
and readers, and it was so understood by them, as charging, 
asserting, and imputing that this plaintiff was a communist 
sympathizer or fellow traveler, and that this plaintiff had 
received a recommendation from 'The San Francisco People's 
World,' and that the said San Francisco People's World had 
'distributed a last-minute extra edition in Oakland' which 
allegedly contained the recommendation as aforesaid, (when 
in truth and in fact The San Francisco People's World did 
not endorse or recommend plaintiff in said article), and all 
said charges, references, assertions, and imputations were 
false, malicious, and unprivileged, and were calculated to 
and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and 
obloquy, causing him to be shunned and avoided, an~ proxi-
mately caused him to sustain a severe and continuing nervous 
shock and strain and to suffer great mental anguish, mortifica-
tion, humiliation, and shame; all to his damage in the sum of 
*200,000.00. " 
As a result of the publication of the article, plaintiff alleges 
that he has suffered pecuniary loss, in that an uIlllsually large 
percentage of old and established patients have been cancel-
ling appointments and that there has been a sharp decline in 
the number of new patients normally to be expected. 
It was also averred that plaintiff served on defendant a 
demand for retraction, as provided in section 48a of the Civil 
Code, but that defendant failed and refused to publish a 
retraction. The alleged demand, a copy of which was attached 
to the complaint, reads: 
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J. R. Knowland 
Publisher, Oakland Tribune 
Tribune Tower 
Oakland, California 
Dear Mr. Knowland: 
April 27, 1955 
I wish to call your attention to a purported news re-
port which appeared in the Oakland Tribune on Tuesday, 
April 19, 1955, in all editions on Page 1 of your publica-
tion. The article reads as follows: 
"RED PAPER ISSUES ELECTION EXTRA 
"The San Francisco People's World, recognized 
throughout the State as the mouthpiece of the communist 
party, distributed a last-minute extra edition in Oakland 
yesterday, on the eve of the city election. 
"It verified reports that the paper is showing unusual 
interest in Oakland and its city election. The communist-
line paper defended the proposal to revive ward politics 
in Oakland and printed a list of recommendations which 
included the names of council candidates John F. Quinn, 
John W. Holmdahl and Dr. Grover H. MacT.Jeod. It also 
listed recommendations against police reorganization 
measures which were endorsed by the Alameda County 
Grand Jury following its recent investigation. 
"The polls are open until 7 p.m. today." 
This article is grossly libelous and I therefore demand 
that the same be corrected or retracted as provided in 
Section 48(a) of the Oivil Code of the State of Oali-
fornia. 
GHM/mjn 
Very truly yours, 
sl Grover H. MacLeod, D.D.S. 
GROVER H. MACLEOD, D.D.S. 
The prayer of the complaint was for special damages ill thf" 
Rum of $5,000, general damages of $200,000 and exemplary, 
damages of $200,000. I 
These questions are presented: 
First. Did the complaint state a cause of actiont 
No, for the following reasons: I 
1. The article printed by defendant was not libelous as tOI 
! 
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plaint.iff, f;ill(~C the only st.atelmmt cOIl('.erning him he concedes 
to be true.:: 
'l'he sole l;talement concerning plaintiff is that the San Fran-
Cil;CO People's World printed a list of recommendations for 
candidates for the City Council of Oakland and plaintiff's 
llame was included thereon. 
The law is established in California that there is no libel if 
the charge against the plaintiff is true, irrespective of the 
wording used by the defendaut in making the charge. (Emde 
v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 160 [8] 
[143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916] ; Babcock v. McClatchy News-
papers, 82 Cal.App.2d 528, 536 [186 P.2d 737]; Glenn v. 
Gibson, 75 Cal.App.2d 649, 661 [6] [171 P.2d 118] ; McLaugh-
lin v. Standard Acc. In$. Co., 15 Cal.App.2d 558, 566 [59 P.2d 
631].) 
The gist of the charge against plaintiff is that the San 
Francisco People's World printed a list of recommendations 
for theof'fice of councilman of the city of Oakland, which list 
included plaintiff's name. Therefore, since it is conceded 
that the charge was true, defendant is exempt from liability. 
(Emde v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, supra, p. 160.) 
2. The article printed by defendant is not libelous because, 
under plaintiff's own statement, there is no libelous matter in 
the alleged defamatory article. 
The substance of the article is that the San Francisco 
People's W orId, a San Francisco mouthpiece of the Commu-
nist Party, issued an election extra on the eve of a city 
election in Oakland showing an unusual interest in an Oak-
land city election; defended the proposal to revive ward 
politics in Oakland; printed a list of recommendations for the 
c~ty council, which list included plaintiff's name; and listed 
recommendations against certain police reorganization meas-
ures endorsed by the grand jury. The article further stated 
the hours when the polls would be open. Plaintiff, at the hear-
ing on the demurrer and in this court, has taken the position 
that all of the Tribune article is false.' 
".At the time of the argument, the following colloquy between the 
court and plaintiff's counsel occurred: 
"The Court: In other words, do I understand that you deny that the 
paper printed a list of recommendations which included the name of the 
Plaintiff' 
"Mr. MacLeod: We do not deny that, your Honor." 
"Plaintiff, in his opening brief, p. 13, states that he "takee the posi· 
tion that all of said article is false, and he bas so plentled in his com· 
plaint.' , 
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Plaintiff is confronted with this dilemma: 
. (a) If it is as.'>umed, as plaintiff unequivocally contends. 
that all of tbe 'l'ribune article is false, then he asserts the San 
)j'rancisco People's \Vorld is not a communistic newspaper. 
)j'or the purposes of the demurrer, the trial court properly 
assumed this to be the fact. 
The charge concerning plaintiff in the article is the singlc 
statement that the San Francisco People's World printed a 
list of recommendations which included the names of council 
candidates, among others that of plaintiff. Aceordingly, tbe 
gist of the alleged defamatory matter is that the San Fran-
cisco People's World, declared noncommunistic by plaintiff, 
printed a list of recommendations for the city council, among 
which plaintiff's name was included, 
Obviously, there is no defamatory sting in the statement 
concerning plaintiff. The meaning of the charge is plain. He 
is not accused of wrongdoing of any kind; in fact, he is not 
accused of doing anything. A third party, a San Francisco 
newspaper, is charged with printing his name along with those 
of two others as recommended candidates. 
Plaintiff, a candidate for councilman, is not defamed by a 
statement that he is one of three· who were recommended for 
the office of city councilman. To say that a candidate for 
public office in one city has been recommended by a newspaper 
published in another city is no more than saying that the 
candidate, without any solicitation on his part, has received 
support from a source which he believes will not help him 
politically. The fact that a publication is unpleasant or hostile 
does not make it actionable. (Mortensen v. Los Angeles Exam-
iner, 112 Cal.App. 194, 202 [2] [296 P. 927].) 
It is established law that it is not libelous to accuse one of 
doing a legal act, even though stroug epithets are usen in 
describing the act. (Sullivan v. lVarner Bros. Thea.tres, Inc., 
42 Cal.App.2d 660, 663 [5] [109 P.2d 760] [hearing denied 
by the Supreme Court].) It is also established that in every 
actionable defamation it is necessary that there be defamation i 
apparent from the words themselves, for no innuendo ean 
alter their sense. (Emde v. San Joaq1tin County etc. Council, 
supra, p. 159 [7]; Grand v. Dreyfus, 122 Cal. 58, 62 [54 P. 
389].) 
The complaint here fails to show any defamation apparent 
from the words themselves. The words uscd concerning plain-
tiff are simple and clear and do 110t derame. Charging that a 
candidate for public offi('e rerrin'll a rccoIl1nH'IHlation from 
(J 
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a source which he believes will injure him in his political 
campaign may offend him, but where, as here, he is not 
. charged with anything othcr than having received the rec-
ommendation and he concedes that fact to be true, it does not 
libel him. Clearly, therefore, it was not defamatory to charge 
. truthfully that a noncommnnistic newspaper printed a list of ' 
recommended candidates in which plaintiff's name was in-
cluded. 
Counsel for defendant in oral argument aptly illustrated 
the point that the article was not libelous per 8e, as follows: 
"I wonder if it can be said that the man in the street be-
licves that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a Communist, or a 
Communist sympathizer, or a Communist Fellow-Traveler--
"The Chief Justice: Some do. 
"Mr. Houlihan: --simply because he was endorsed, if yon 
please, which is more than we said in the publication, by the 
Communist Party in publications; by reason of the treatment 
that he received at the hands of the Communist press, the 
most favorable treatment, can it be said that any type of 
statement of that kind leaves the man in the street with the 
exclusive conviction that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a 
Communist or a Communist sympathizer, or a Communist 
Fellow-Traveled That is the kind of construction that is 
forbidden by all of the decisions of this Court and the District 
Court of Appeal, in determining whether or not the language 
is libelous per se, because when we get into strained construc-
tion we confess the existence of a covert meaning, and the 
covert meaning is not what we are looking for in a libel 
per se case." 
In connection with the foregoing statement, the words of 
Mr. Chief Jnstice Gibson, speaking for this court in Gom-
munist Parly v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 547 [127 P.2d 889], are 
here pertinent. He said: "Not only do plaintiffs vigorously 
assert that the Communist Party does not advocate force and 
violence, but the decided cases have definitely demonstrated 
that the fact here alleged to exist is not the subject of judicial 
notice. In State v. Reeves, 5 Wn.2d 637 [106 P.2d 729, 130 
A.L.R. 1465], the attorney general of Washington urged, as 
do defendants here, that the Communist Party should be kept 
off the ballot and that the courts could take judicial knowledge 
of the fact that the party advocated force and violence. The 
Supreme Conrt refused to take judicial notice of that fact 
for the reason that the litigants denied it. Furthermore, it 
'vas said, if the court in the election rase were to make a 
o 
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judicial finding on the question it would be tantamount to 
holding all registered communists were guilty of violating 
the criminal syndicalism act in the absence of evidence on 
the question. The court pointed out that the cas('s relied 
upon by the attorney general in that ease (as are most. of the 
cases relied upon by defendants) dealt with the deportation of 
aliens, and were cases reviewing an administrative record 
which did not involve judicial notice at all. In Ex parte 
Fierstein, 41 F.2d 53, a similar contention was made before 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. There the court reversed 
an order of deportation which had been predicated on proof 
the alien was a communist. Judge Wilbur, speaking for a 
unanimous court, held that the court could not take judicial 
notice of the fact that the Communist Party advocates force 
and violence, and that the order could not stand in the absence 
of evidence of that fact. Referring to some of the cases relied 
upon by defendants in the present case, the court stated 
(p. 54): "Vhile the character of this organization has fre-
quently been considered by the court, and in some very recent 
cases, Whitney v. Oalifornia, 274 U.S. 357 [47 S.Ct. 641, 71 
L.Ed. 1095] ; Antolish v. Paul (C.C.A.), 283 Fed. 957; Skef-
fington v. KatzefJ, 277 Fed. 129; Ex parle Jurgans (D.C.), 
17 F.2d 507, the decisions in these cases are based upon the 
evidence adduced before the court with reference to the char-
acter of this organization, and the statements made in the 
opinions of the court with reference to that organization are 
based upon the testimony before the court, and in no instance 
has the court attempted to take judicial notice of the char-
acter of this organization.' 
"None of the cases cited compels a contrary conclusion. 
Most, if not all, of the federal cases relied upon did not involve 
the question of judicial notice at all. They were cases in-
volving reviews of determinations by the Department of 
Labor, which by law is vested with fact-finding power and 
whose determinations were predicated on evidence. These 
cases were so distinguished ill the Reeves and Fierstein cases, 
!I1tpra. In the case of In re Ooon, 44 Cal.App.2d 531 [112 
P.2d 767], the appellate court did state (p. 543): 'It is a 
matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party 
comes within that category'-that is, within the group that 
advocates and practices the overthrow of government by sub-
versive activities. The statement was not only dictum, but 
it had no reference to the doctrine of .inuicial knowledge 
which was not involved in the case. The same can be said 
C) 
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of Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77 [143 S.W.2d 567J; As was 
pointed out in the R.eeves case, supra, to hold that this court 
will take judicial notice of the alleged fact that the Com-
munist Party advocates force and violence, without any evi-
"dence of that fact, would not only require judicial notice of a 
fact which plaintiffs and their counsel vehemently deny, but 
it would also necessitate a finding that every registered com-
munist is a felon and could be convicted of a violation of our 
criminal syndicalist law upon mere proof of membership 
in the Communist Party. That is not the law." 
(b) If, on the other hand, it is assumed, contrary to plain-
tiff's claim, that the People's World is a communistic publica-
tion, we find there was a charge that a communistic newspaper 
printed recommendations favoring measures which were not 
communistic and recommendations favoring plaintiff as a can-
didate. There is no clear meaning from this charge that plain-
tiff was a communist. 
In Harris tI. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal.App.2d 340, 345 
[3] et seq. [121 P.2d 761], a charge that many in the plain-
tiff's community were communists, contained in an article 
which severely criticized the plaintiff and others for their 
radical policies as officeholders, was held not to be defamatory 
as to the plaintiff even though in the article there were veiled 
inferences of communistic connections and it was probably 
intended to imply that the plaintiff was one of the communist 
group. The charge was held to lack the required certainty of 
having a clear meaning that the plaintiff was a communist. 
Even though a defamatory implication is shown upon the 
face of a publication, if it is also subject to innocent inter-
pretation the language is said to be equivocal, and the pub-
lication thereof is not libelons per se. (Washer v. Bank of 
America, 21 CaUd 822, 828 [2] [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 
1338] ; Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, supra, p. 534 [3] ; 
Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal.App.2d 581, 584 [3] [126 P.2d 
668] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].) 
Under either assumption of fact, the article did not charg~ 
that plaintiff was a communist, and it was therefore not 
libelous. 
3. Plaintiff cannot by innuendo allegations make libelous 
a nondefamatory, simple statement which is not libelous. 
Plaintiff has admitted the truth of the gist of the charge, to 
wit, the printing of a list by a San Francisco newspaper, and 
since there was no defamatory stiug in the statement con-
cerning plaintiff, there was no libel. 
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The rille is set.tl~d that. where the word~ of a charge are 
not libelolls according to their common usage, the pleader will 
not be allowed to change or enlarge their meaning so as to 
m~ke such words libelous. (Emde v. San J oaqu·in County etc. 
COU1ICil,.sltpra, p. 159 [7]; Jackson v. U·nderwriters' Report, 
Inc., 21 CaL<\.pp.2d 591, 597 [6] [69 P.2d 878]; Vedovi v. 
Watson & Taylor, 104 Cal.App. 80, 88 [7] [285 P. 418] 
[hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; cf. Peabody v. 
Barham, supra, p. 584 [3].) 
Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the present 
case, it is apparent that the words of the article published 
by defendant do not have a defamatory meaning when rea-
sonably interpreted; therefore, they are not libelous. The 
language of the charge is as simple, plain and commonplace 
as language can be. Nothing is hidden or concealed in the 
words. They are admittedly true. Reasonably interpreted, 
they convey no defamatory meaning. Plaintiff, by innuendo, 
has attempted to alter the sense of simple, ordinary, unam-
biguous, truthful words to make defamatory language that 
is not defamatory. Under the above stated rules he cannot 
do this. 
Second. Was the articl. published by defendant "fair 
comment'" 
Yes. Mere expressions of opinion or severe criticism are 
not libelous if they clearly go only to the merits or demerits 
of a condition, cause or controversy which is under public 
scrutiny, even though they may reflect adversely upon the 
political activities or fitness for office of an individual who 
is intimately connected with the principal object of the at-
tack. (Howard v. Southern Calif. etc. Newspapers, 95 Cal. 
App.2d 580, 584 [3] [213 P.2d 399] ; Babcock v. McClatchy 
Newspapers, supra, p. 535 [6]; Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal.App. 
324, 328 [2] et seq. [264 P. 803] ; cf. Glenn v. Gibson, supra, 
p.659 [4] ; Gosewisch v. Doran, 161 Cal. 511,514 [119 P. 656, 
Ann.Cas. 1913D 442].) . 
From the article published, it appears that it was the aim 
of defendant to emphasize what it said was an unusual oc-
currence--the great interest shown by a San Francisco news-
paper in an Oakland city election. It appeared that at this 
election the people were to vote on police reorganization 
measures which had been endorsed by the Alameda County 
Grand Jury, a proposal to revive ward politics in Oakland, 
and the election of members of the city council. The article 
stated that a San Francisco newspaper immediately before 
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the election defended the proposal to revive ward polities 
in Oakland, printed a list. or recommendations, which included 
the name of plaintiff, and also listed recommendations against 
the police reorganization measures. The language of the 
article was mild, dignified and tempered and was devoid of 
epi~hets and vituperative, scurrilous or abusive statements. 
Malversation on the part of plaintiff was not charged. 
The article called attention to the fact that it was unusual 
for a San Francisco newspaper to print recommendations 011 
what defendant regarded as purely local issues at a local 
election in another city. Obviously, the issues referred 
to in the article were matters of public interest. The article 
dealt with an opinion on how the people should vote on 
measures and candidates. The cause which was under public 
scrutiny related to the merits and demerits of measures and 
candidates. Defendant was here calling to public attention 
the fact that a San Francisco newspaper was opposing the 
recommendations of the Alameda County Grand Jury and 
favoring a measure to restore the ward system in the city 
of Oakland. 
Defendant deemed that it was in the public interest to 
oppose the views of the San Francisco newspaper. 
It might be implied from the article that since the recom-
mendations printed by the San Francisco newspaper were 
unsound as to important measures, they were probably equally 
unsound when applied to candidates. 
The article was one by which defendant sought to convey 
pertinent information to the public on matters of publi(~ 
interest, and it is obvious that it did not exceed the limits or 
fair comment. 
The rule is thus stated in Howard v. Southern Calif. etc. 
Newspapers, supra, p. 584: "Publications by which it is 
sought to convey pertinent information to the public in mat-
ters of public interest are permitted wide latitude. In con-
troversies of a political nature, in particular, the circum-
stances often relieve statements, which might otherwise be 
actionable, of possible defamatory imputations. Mere ex-
pressions of opinion or severe criticism are' not libelous if 
they clearly go only to the merits or demerits of a condition, 
cause or controversy which is under public scrutiny, even 
though they may adversely reflect upon the public activitie!l 
or fitness for office of individuals who are intimately connected 
with the principal object of the attack." 
In the present case the article wa.,> fair comment, made in a 
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political contest dealing with matters of public concern, where 
a broad area of discussion is permitted without civil respon-
sibility for damages. 
'rhird. Was plaintiff's demand for a retraction effectuoU 
No. Section 48a of the Civil Code provides, in part: "In 
. any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a news-
paper .•• plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages 
unless a correction be demanded and be not published ... as 
hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, 
at the place of publication ... a written notice specifying the 
statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same 
be corrected. Said notice and demand must be served within 
20 days after knowledge of the publication ... of the state-
ments claimed to be libelous." (Italics added.) 
The demand for a retraction is ineffectual unless it speci-
fics the statements claimed to be libelous. (Anderson v. 
Hearst Publishing Co., 120 F.Supp. 850, 852 et seq.) In the 
present case plaintiff's demand for a retraction was ineffectual 
because it failed to specify the statements claimed to be 
libelous. 
Plaintiff has repeatedly asscrted that he meant by his plead-
ing that all the statements in the defendant's article were 
false and libelous. As pointed out above, if all the statements 
were untrue, there is no possibility of plaintiff's having been 
libeled, because it is obvious that a statement that a candidate 
received a recommendation from a noncommunist newspaper 
is not defamatory. 
Faced with the knowledge that plaintiff claimed that all the 
statements in defendant's article were false, defendant could 
neither retract nor determine what it was expected to retract. 
Defendant could not retract its statement that the San Fran-
cisco People's World printed a list of recommendations con-
taining plaintiff's name, because that statement is true, as 
plaintiff admits. Defendant could not retract its statement 
that the San Francisco People 's World was a communist 
newspaper, or if it had retracted such statement in response 
to plaintiff's claim that it was untrue, such action would not 
have benefited plaintiff. Defendant could not have been ex-
pected to retract any of the other statements in the article, 
because suell stail'IlIf'nts were aUt'ged by plaintiff to be trut'. 
Defendallt, ellga~«'d ill "complex anll fat·-fiulIg activities," 
is not required to retract true statcments or to guess what 
statements plaintiff orsired retracted, in view of the require-
C) 
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ment of the statute that plaintiff specify the statements 
claimed to be libelous. . 
Fourth. Was plaintiff's demand for special damages valid1 
No. The rule is established that when special damage is 
claimed, the naturc of the loss or injury must be particularly 
. set forth. It is necessary that the declaration set forth pre-
cisely in what way the special damage resulted. (Anderson v. 
Hearst Publishing 00., supra, p. 852; Pollard v. Lyon, 91 
U.S. 225, 237 [23 L.Ed. 308] ; Peabody v. Barham, supra, 
p. 585 [6]; Shook v. Pearson, 99 Cal.App.2d 348, 351 [4] 
[221 P.2d 757].) 
Oberkotter v. Woolman, 187 Cal. 500 [202 P. 669], relied 
on by plaintiff, is not applicable, for the reason that in such 
case no special demurrer was directed to the lack of particu-
larity of allegations of special damages, while in the present 
case there was such a special demurrer. 
Fifth. Did the trial court err in s1tsiaining the dem1trret· 
without leave to amend1 
No. The defects in the complaiut could not be cured by 
amendment, for these reasons : 
1. The gist of the statement complained of is true. It is 
true that the San Francisco People's World printed a list 
of recommendations of candidates in which plaintiff's name 
was included. Obviously, plaintiff cannot amend by now 
claiming as false what he has pleaded and expressly admitted 
to be true. Where, as here, the gist of the charge is true, there 
is no libel. Since plaintiff cannot amend to plead that the 
gist of the charge is false, this defect cannot be cured by 
amendment. 
2. Defendant's statements are not defamatory. Plaintiff, 
by taking the position that all the article is false, in effect 
takes the position that the portion of the article stating that 
the San Francisco People's World is a communist paper is 
false. It is likewise obvious that there is no defamation or 
libel in stating that a noncommunistic newspaper printed an 
endorsement of plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot amend to remedy 
this defect or change a position which he has taken through-
out the entire litigation. It is clearly not defamatory to 
charge that a candidate received an unsolicited recommenda-
tion from a newspaper-be it commuuistic or noncommuuistic 
-and the meaning of such charge cannot be enlarged or 
changed so as to make it defamatory. Plaintiff, by the use 
of innuendo, cannot state a cause of action. 
3. The complaint shows that defendant's statements were 
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fair comment, for the art.icle was olle which contained its 
mildly expressed views Oil the measures and candidates in a 
municipal election. Plaintiff cannot amend to show that the ' 
fair comment privilege did not apply, nor can he amend to 
show actual malice, since pleading of actual malice would 
require an allegation that defendant, in making its statement, 
knew or should have known the charge to be false. Plaintiff 
cannot allege that defendant knew or should have known 
the statement to be false, for the reason that the statement 
was true, as plaintiff admits. 
Since plaintiff could not plead a cause of action through 
amending his complaint, the court properly sustained the 
demurrer without leave to amend. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. In view of plaintiff's concession 
ill the trial court that the People's World had, as stated in 
defendant's article, "printed a list of recommendations which 
included the name of plaintiff," I am in agreement with the 
conclusion reached by Mr. Justice McComb that the judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
31, 1959. Peters, J., did not participate therein. Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
